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Abstract. In this paper, data from Statistics Sweden about students entering upper 
secondary school (10
th grade) in 1994 and graduating in 1996 or 1997, along with 
socioeconomic characteristics from the 1990 census, are used to explore the 
relationship between the market work by mothers and fathers in Sweden and their 
children’s educational achievement, measured as Grade Point Average. The results 
show, in line with previous research, that there is a positive relationship between 
parental income and child GPA. When it comes to the number of hours of work that 
the parents perform in the labour market, the results differ between mothers and 
fathers.  If the mother works less then full time, preferably even less then halftime, it 
has positive effects on the child’s grades. There are no significant effects of the 
father’s hours of work, as long as he works a positive amount of time. The lack of 
effects from the father’s hours of work may, however, be due to lack of variation in 
data. 
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During the past twenty years, researchers in social sciences have been trying to find 
explanations to why some children succeed in life while others do not. The research 
has generated a number of theories and hypotheses regarding parental characteristics 
and their influences on children’s success, measuring the degree of success in several 
different ways, educational performance being the outcome variable most widely 
used. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between the market work 
by mothers and fathers in Sweden and their children’s educational achievement, 
measured as Grade Point Average, while controlling for a wide range of other 
socioeconomic variables. 
 
One of the hypotheses that has gained a lot of attention in previous research is the 
“working mother hypothesis”
1 where the labour force participation by mothers is said 
to have two offsetting effects. The mother working and contributing to family income 
may have a positive effect on the child’s future success. At the same time, the 
mother’s absence from home may have a negative impact on the child’s development. 
One of the reasons why it is interesting to do this type of research using Swedish data 
is that Sweden, since the mid-1960s, has had a high quality child care system, which 
has encouraged the labour market activities of women. Seen in the light of the 
working mother hypothesis, it is not obvious that such a policy would have solely 
positive effects in the long run. Also, it is not obvious that only the hours worked by 
mothers should matter, labour force participation by fathers might be of importance as 
well. Previous studies have not included data on fathers’ labour force participation.  
 
Among the studies focusing on school achievement as dependent variable, the centre 
of attention has been on a variety of socioeconomic factors and parental 
characteristics. In these studies parental income generally has been found to have a 
strong positive effect. Parental education and occupational status are also found to 
have positive and significant effects on children’s educational achievements.
2 The 
educational level of the mother has often been found to be more highly correlated 
                                                 
1 The hypothesis is first mentioned by Haveman, Wolfe and Spaulding (1991). Hetherington, Camara 
and Featherman (1983) found results consistent with the hypothesis.  
2 See Hill and Duncan (1987) for a review. 
  1with the educational achievements of the child than has the fathers’ educational level. 
The explanation is thought to be that mothers usually spend more time with their 
children than fathers do.
3 Growing up in a single parent household seems to have a 
negative impact on outcomes, so has the number of siblings if you are not the eldest.
4 
The number of regional moves by the family and the number of school moves by the 
student are also associated with poor academic performance. Pribesh and Downey 
(1999) find that this result is partially due the decline in social relationships by 
students who move, but that pre-existing differences between the movers and the non-
movers captures most of the effect. Other variables found to be of importance are for 
instance gender, race and religion of the child.  
 
When it comes to testing for the influence of mothers’ work on children’s educational 
achievement, the results are inconsistent. Murnane, Maynard and Ohls (1981) find no 
evidence that children in low income families whose mothers work outside the home 
achieve less in school than children whose mothers do not work outside the home. 
Leibowitz (1977) finds the same result for middle-class families. Both these studies 
indicate that mothers who work outside the home decrease their time spent on 
housework, but that they do not substantially decrease their time spent with their 
children. Stafford (1986) finds a significant and negative effect of mothers’ market 
work on the teacher’s ratings of the child. For children aged 12-15, Haveman, Wolfe 
and Spaulding (1991) instead find a positive relation between mothers working and 
the child’s performance in school.  
 
Instead of testing for the influence of mothers’ work on children’s school 
achievement in terms of grades, Datcher-Loury (1988) focused on the time spent on 
child care by mothers and its effect on children’s years of schooling. She finds that 
higher maternal home production increases child care time, but that child care time 
decreases with higher opportunity costs of home time. Children’s years of schooling 
rises significantly with maternal child care time. 
 
Socioeconomic background is not the only thing taken into consideration in the 
literature of children’s educational achievements. School specific variables such as 
                                                 
3 See Leibowitz (1974) and Hill and Stafford (1980).  
4 See McLanahan (1985), Keith and Finlay (1985). 
  2the number of students in each class, the number of teachers and the overall school 
spending is also often included. In a series of reviews on research considering 
production and efficiency in public schools by Hanushek (1986, 1989, 1996, 1997, 
2003) educational inputs are found to be relatively unimportant in explaining student 
outcomes, and the impact of any particular input has been inconsistent across studies. 
Krueger (2003) reanalyses the data in Hanushek’s reviews and finds that results from 
literature summaries are critically dependent upon the weight that each study is given 
and that the literature suggests a positive effect of smaller classes on student 
achievement. Moreover, there are some recent studies finding effects, both positive 
and negative, of school variables and this makes it important to control for them. 
Bonesrønning (2003), for example, in a study based on Norwegian data, finds a 
negative effect of class size on individual student’s school performance. 
 
In the economic literature of education there is large empirical support of the view 
that the school achievements of a child are not only affected by socioeconomic factors 
or differences in school quality, but that the peers also play an important role. In fact, 
the effect of school characteristics is often found to disappear when peer groups are 
controlled for. 
5 Roberson and Symons (2001) study what determines school achieve-
ment at age 11 and the links between the school attainment and earnings at age 33. 
They find strong evidence of peer group effects, and state that better peer groups 
bring up better behaved children.   
 
One of the contributions of this paper is that the empirical analysis, in contrast to most 
of the previous research in this area, is based upon Swedish data instead of data from 
the US. The institutional and social environment in Sweden is somewhat different 
from that in the US. For example, Sweden has a well developed public child care 
system where most children participate. In addition, it is fairly common for Swedish 
fathers to take parental leave, and parents often share custody after divorce. 
Differences of this kind make the analysis interesting. 
  
Another contribution of this paper is the richness of the data. The dataset contains 
about 50  000 individuals and includes a wide variety of socioeconomic variables, 
                                                 
5 See Evans, Oats and Schwab (1992).  
  3enabling control for many aspects that may influence children’s educational 
achievement. Moreover, I have information about the grade point average both when 
the student graduated from compulsory school and when he or she graduated from 
upper secondary school. This means that it is possible for me to analyse how the 
socioeconomic history of the child influences the educational achievements in both 
compulsory school and in upper secondary school separately. It is also possible to 
analyse overall effects. However, the most important contribution of this paper, 
pertaining from the richness of the data, is that the dataset contains labour force 
participation of both parents, making it possible to test if the labour force participation 
of fathers is of importance in explaining children’s educational achievements.  
 
This paper is based upon a cooperative bargaining model that gives a guideline for the 
empirical estimations and is presented in section two. The data and descriptive 
statistics are displayed and discussed in section three and in section four the empirical 
findings are presented. The paper ends with a concluding summary which is given in 
section five.  
 
  42 Theoretical  Background 
 
Among economists, the view of decision-making within the family has varied over 
time. The traditional approach to study intra-household distribution of demand and 
supply has been that the household maximizes a single utility function
6. A newer, and 
more realistic, view of decision-making within the family is the theory of bargaining, 
which recognizes that households may not behave as a single decision maker
7. 
Pluralistic decision-making can, in turn, be divided into two main categories of 
models, non-cooperative bargaining models and cooperative bargaining models
8.  
 
In the non-cooperative models, each spouse maximizes a utility function conditioned 
on her or his Nash-conjecture about the other spouse’s behaviour. The result of such a 
model is under-provision of the household public good because neither of the spouses 
takes the other’s utility into consideration when they decide how much work to put 
into home production. Weiss and Willis (1985) suggest that divorced couples might 
reach this type of inefficient agreement since they are not able to observe each others 
actions.  
 
In the cooperative bargaining models two spouses maximize an objective that reflects 
a combination of their utility functions, subject to a single budget constraint for the 
family. If an agreement is reached, the allocation is Pareto-efficient. Because of the 
repeated interaction and the fact that spouses are able to monitor each others choices 
closely it is likely that married couples are able to reach an efficient agreement. It is 
also likely that the spouses would strive to reach such an agreement because they are 
both better off if they do. A cooperative bargaining model is the type of model that 
this empirical analysis is built upon. The theory is not to be tested in this paper but is 
merely meant to be used as a guideline for how to estimate the production function of 
the household public good.  
 
                                                 
6 See for example Samuelson (1956), and Becker (1974). 
7 See for example Manser and Brown (1980), and McElroy and Horney (1981). 
8 See Bergstrom (1997) for a review of how economists view of decision-making within the family has 
developed over time. 
  5Consider a household with two adult members, m (he) and f (she) and a child. Each 
household member, i, gets utility from three goods: leisure, , a purely private good, 
, , and a household public good to be interpreted as the educational achievements of 
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the utility functions are twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and all 
goods are essential. 
 
Each decision unit allocates his or her total time T between working in the labour 
market,  , working at home,  , or enjoying leisure. By choosing to work at home, 
the spouse contributes to the child’s educational achievement. The spouses are not by 
necessity equally productive in providing for the proper care that the child needs to 
succeed in school and productivity is described by h
i l i t
i. 
 
The child’s educational achievement is not fully explained by the time that the parents 
devote or their productivity, but is also depending on some school specific variables, 
z, and some child specific variables, x. This means that the educational achievement 
of the child will have the following form: 
 
( ) G x z h h t t G G f m f m n
~
, , , , , , =   
 
where contains the socioeconomic characteristics that might influence the 
educational achievement of the child. These are characteristics related to the child 
itself, its parents and the school that the child attends. They will be further explained 




Let the productivity in the labour market be described by the exogenously given 
hourly wage, wi. Then private consumption of the spouses can be described by: 
 
() ∑ ∑ + ≤ i i i i y l w C  
  6 
where   is the exogenously given non-labour income.  i y
 
The spouses are distinguished from two single individuals on the basis of pooling 
resources and allocating them jointly. Since the empirical study is based upon 
historical data, the decision about hours of work in the labour market has already been 
made. Therefore the household decision problem will be solved contingent on hours 
of work in the labour market; this allows me to separately study the effect of income 
and hours of work on the household public good. The decision problem facing the 
household can be described as follows: 
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subject to:  ( ) G x z h h t t G G f m f m
~
, , , , , , =  
    () ∑ ∑ + ≤ i i i i y l w C
  i i i L t l T + + =    where i = m, f 
 
The first restriction is the production function for the household public good, the 
second restriction is the budget constraint for private consumption and the third 
restriction is the time constraint. 
 
Solving the above problem will give the equation for time in household production as: 
 
( ) G x z h h l l Y t t f m f m i
~
, , , , , , , =     where  ( ) ∑ + = i i i y l w Y  for i = m, f 
 
Substituting this into the production function for the household public good gives: 
 
( ) G x z h h l l Y G G f m f m
~
, , , , , , , =   
which is the equation that will be estimated in this paper. Specifically I will focus on 
estimating the influence of socioeconomic characteristics on the child’s educational 
achievement.  
  73   Data 
 
The Swedish public school system is made up of nine years of compulsory schooling. 
After that, students can continue on to two or three years of non compulsory 
schooling
9 in the form of upper secondary school, which is something that almost all 
students in Sweden do (about 95 % in 1994).  
 
This empirical study is based on data covering all students entering upper secondary 
school (10
th grade) in 1994 and graduating in 1996 or 1997, depending upon the 
length of the educational program, (about 50 000) in Sweden. The data has been 
retrieved from Statistics Sweden (SCB) and contains school information along with 
socioeconomic characteristics from the 1990 census. The data includes gender, 
nationality, age, residence, graduating grades from the last year of compulsory school 
and the last year of upper secondary school, choice of educational-program in 
secondary school, and information about family structure together with 
socioeconomic situation. The variables that are included in the empirical analysis in 
this paper are explained below and descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. 
 
The educational achievement of the child is what I want to estimate. In order to do 
this, the grades from the last year of compulsory school and the last year of upper 
secondary school are used as dependent variables in the estimations. The grade from 
the last year of compulsory school is also included as an explanatory variable in some 
of the estimations.  
 
The variables used to estimate the influence of socioeconomic characteristics on the 
child’s educational achievement,G , are divided into three groups: child related 
variables, parent related variables and school related variables.  
~
 
                                                 
9 These students are the last ones to be able to choose a two year upper secondary education. Now, the 
upper secondary school in Sweden consist only of different three year educational programs. 
  83.1  Child Related Variables 
The child related variables, x , consists of child specific characteristics that might 
influence the child’s grade, like gender, immigrant status and if the child has lived 
through a divorce.  
 
A dummy variable indicating being a second generation immigrant is included since 
having immigrant parents might affect the grade as, for example, they may have a 
harder time helping their children with homework. This might be even more obvious 
in the case of first generation immigrants simply because the parents then have been 
in Sweden for a shorter time period. In addition, for first generation immigrants, the 
child itself might also have trouble with the language; therefore, a second dummy is 
included for this group. A third dummy is included for children born abroad, with 
Swedish born parents. It is included since this group to a large extent consists of 
adopted children and they, according to some earlier research
10, have a harder time 
succeeding in school.  
 
I have included a single parent household dummy because it is likely that living in 
dissolved or single parent families is associated with different kinds of problems. 
Single parents do not have the same resources, in the form of time and money to 
spend, to provide for their children as do two-parent families. As a consequence, 
children from single parent households might have disadvantages compared to other 
children that might affect their achievements. 
 
The child specific variables also include the choice of education program to control 
for the possibility that teacher ratings differ between educational programs, and that 
children in different educational programs take different courses. Here, a three year 
social sciences education in upper secondary school with special interest in social 
science is used as a reference case.  
 
When it comes to the grades, this data set is somewhat unique. During the schooling 
of these students, the grading system in Sweden was changed. The students graduated 
from compulsory school with grades from a norm referenced grading system where 
                                                 
10 See for example Brodzinsky, et. al. (1984). 
  9the “average class” of the nation (riksklass) set the standard. That grading system had 
a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest grade you could get, and 3 representing 
average achievement. When graduating from upper secondary school, the students are 
graded according to a criterion referenced system where the focus is to estimate how 
well the student has met a standardized knowledge criterion instead of comparing the 
students to the “average class”.  The new grading system has four levels; fail, pass, 
pass with distinction and pass with special distinction. This four level scale is then 
converted into a quantified scale and weighted with course load together with the 
length of the courses before the grade is positioned on a scale between 0 and 200.  
 
To take into account the importance of peer group effects, found in previous studies, 
the average grade of the other students attending the same class is included in later 
estimations. Peer group can bee influential in different ways, depending on who you 
are. For example, reasonably good students have a better chance of performing well 
themselves in a class that performs well on average, other things equal. It can 
however be hard to interpret the effect of peer groups in empirical papers. The effects 
can be overestimated due to ambitious parents seeking out the best schools for their 




3.2 Parent  Related  Variables 
The parent related variables come from the 1990 census and they consist of total 
parental income and parental hours of work in the labour market as well as other 
parent related variables. The other parent related variables are included to control for 
the parents productivity in the production of the household public good (or the 
educational achievement of the child),   and  , since this is not possible to directly 
observe. 
m h f h
 
The total labour income variable is likely to have positive effects on the child’s grade. 
For the hours of work in the labour market performed by the parents, the reference 
case is working full time (35 hours or more). Parents not working at all or working 
part time, either between 1 and 19 hours or between 20 and 34 hours is then compared 
                                                 
11 Roberson and Symons (2001). 
  10to the reference case. The other parent related variables consist of parental age and a 
dummy for parental higher education in the form of undergraduate or graduate 
university studies. The reference case for parental education is compulsory or upper 
secondary school, which have not been divided into separate dummies since almost 
all of the parents have graduated from upper secondary school. The parental education 
dummy is likely to have a positive effect on the child’s school achievements. 
 
3.3  School Related Variables 
The school related variables, z, in the production function of the household public 
good consist of the average number of students registered in the municipality during 
the three years of schooling and the average number of teachers per 100 students. The 
first is meant to capture the effect of living in a larger municipality with larger 
schools, and larger classes. The second is included since it might have a positive 
effect on the child’s school performance if there are more teachers devoting their time 
to the child. 
  11Table 1. Variable explanations and descriptive statistics 
 
Name Description  Mean   




   
Grade point average, average grade when graduating from 
9






Grade point average, average grade when graduating from 









Sec. gen.  
immigrant 
A dummy that takes the value one if the child was born in 







A dummy that takes the value one if the child as well as at 






A dummy that takes the value one if the child was born 
outside of Sweden but the parents where born in Sweden, 




TT  A dummy that takes the value one for a two year theoretical 




TP  A dummy that takes the value one for a two year practical 




IP  A dummy that takes the value one for an individual program 




N  A dummy that takes the value one for a three year natural 




TS  A dummy that takes the value one for a three year technical 




SBA   A dummy that takes the value one for a three year social 
sciences education in upper secondary school, with special 




SL  A dummy that takes the value one for a three year social 
sciences education in upper secondary school, with special 




SMC   A dummy that takes the value one for a three year social 
sciences education in upper secondary school, with special 







th grade of the peers in the upper secondary class 





Divorce  A dummy that takes the value one if the child comes from a 




  12Table 1. Continued 
 
Parent related variables  Mother  Father 









A dummy that takes the value one if the parent attended 









A dummy  that takes the value one if the mother was 








A dummy that takes the value one if the mother worked 1-19 







A dummy that takes the value one  if the mother worked 20-







A dummy that takes the value one if the mother was 







A dummy that takes the value one if the father worked 1-19 






A dummy that takes the value one if the father worked 20-34 






Total income, in thousands, of the mother and the father 












Average number of students registered in the municipality  
during the three years of upper secondary school and the last 








Average number of teachers per 100 students in the muni-
cipality during the three years of upper secondary school and 






Note: Standard deviations are given parentheses 
  134 Empirical  Findings 
 
In this section the empirical findings are presented and analysed. A large number of 
earlier studies indicate that income pooling does not always give a true description of 
how a family functions
12. In line with these studies, a test on the data used in this 
paper show that the hypothesis of pooling can be rejected
13 and the total income 
variable will in the following be separated into two income variables, one for the 
mother and the father respectively.
14  
 
In order to analyse the influences of socioeconomic variables on different educational 
levels, three separate models are estimated. The results are given in Table 2. In the 
model labelled GPA 9
th grade, the grade point average from ninth year of compulsory 
school is used as a dependent variable. In this model, the influences on of parental 
work hours on the achievements in compulsory school are analysed. In the second 
model, that is labelled GPA total, grade point average when graduating from upper 
secondary school is used as a dependent variable. This model measures the influence 
of parental work hours on the educational achievements all the way through the upper 
secondary school. The same dependent variable as in the second model is being used 
in the third model presented Table 2. What distinguishes the third model from the 
second is that the grade point average from compulsory school is included in the latter 
model. Hence, this model separates the additional effects of parental work hours on 
educational achievements in upper secondary school. Below, the estimation results 
from the three models will be discussed.   
 
4.1  Child Related Variables 
As can be seen in Table 2 the signs and significance levels of the coefficients are not 
changing much
15 between the three models. In accordance with previous research, 
male students perform worse than female students both in compulsory and upper 
                                                 
12 See for example Fortin and Lacroix (1997). 
13 A t-test performed on a sub-sample including only parents that are married and living together shows 
that the hypothesis of pooling can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level. 
14 In the theoretical background in this paper, it does not matter who has the income in the family. 
Despite this shortcoming of the theory, it is still useful since it gives a guideline of which variables to 
include in the estimations. 
15 The reader should note that the dependent variable in the third model is on a different scale then in 
the first two models.  
  14secondary school. Having immigrant parents is negative for the upper secondary 
school grades, but there is no significant effect on the GPA from ninth year of 
compulsory school. However, being a first generation immigrant has a negative effect 
on both grades. In addition, children born abroad attain lower grades, on average, than 
native born children. One might suspect that many of the children in this group are 
adopted, and the negative coefficient is in line with some previous findings
16. 
Furthermore, as in for example McLanahan (1985) and Keith and Finlay (1985), the 
experience of a separation between the parents is also found to have a negative effect 
on the child’s educational achievements measured both as GPA from upper secondary 
school as well as GPA from compulsory school.  
 
The coefficients for choice of educational program variables changes drastically 
between the last two models. When comparing these models, it is clear that students 
with lower grades are more likely to take part in the TP education, the SMC education 
or the SBA education. Moreover, students with better grades to a larger extent 
participate in the N education or the TS education. When GPA from compulsory 
school is controlled for, the coefficients for most of the programs change their signs, 
implying that given your grades from compulsory school it is harder to get good 
grades in the N education and in the TS education respectively. One explanation 
could be that the students in the N program take other subjects than the students in the 
S education. For example they take physics, chemistry and more maths. The students 
choosing the TS education to a large extent take the same classes as do the N students 
even though the points required for admission is much lower, this might be the 
explanation to why they get lower grades.  
 
4.2 Parent  Related  Variables 
Both total income and human capital of the parents, measured as number of years of 
schooling, are variables that frequently are included in studies of children’s 
educational attainment. The two variables are almost always found to be positively 
associated with the educational achievement of the child. In all three models of Table 
2 it can be seen that, when hours of work are controlled for, the child’s GPA increases 
with parents’ total income and higher education. The mother’s income having a 
                                                 
16 See for example Brodzinsky, et. al. (1984). 
  15positive effect on the child’s educational achievement is consistent with the working 
mother hypothesis. The positive effect of the mother’s educational level is larger than 
that of the father’s in the first and second models. This means that for compulsory 
school grades, the human capital of the mother is more important. This result is in 
accordance with previous research (e.g. Leibowitz (1974) and Hill and Stafford 
(1980)). In upper secondary school however, the dominating effect of the mother’s 
human capital has faded and the human capital of the father is now more important. 
When it comes to parental age, children whose parents where young when their child 
was born, attain lower grades, on average, than those whose parents where older.  
 
Again, in accordance with the working mother hypothesis, the hours of work 
performed by mothers seems to be of importance for children’s educational 
achievements. If the mother works part-time when the child is 10-11 years old, 
especially if working less then halftime, a positive effect on the child’s GPA is found. 
However, having a mother that does not work at all is just as bad as having a mother 
that works full time. These results are in line with the findings by Stafford (1986).  
The results are similar in all three models, indicating that the labour market work by 
mothers is not only important for the compulsory school grades, but that the effects 
are prevailing into upper secondary school when compulsory school grades are 
controlled for. Even though the effects are significant, it is important to note that they 
are small compared to the effect of, for example, higher education.  
 
When it comes to the number of hours worked by the father, they seem to be of minor 
importance as long as he works. There are, however, negative effects of having a 
father that does not work at all on the upper secondary school grades. This is 
interesting since one might expect that variables like these would have a larger impact 
on the child’s earlier grades. There are no other significant effects of the father’s 
hours of work; however, these results should be interpreted with caution. The 
variation in the hours of work performed by the father is small, almost all of the 
fathers work full time. If there were more observations of fathers working part time, 
maybe significant effects could be found.   
 
  164.3  School Related Variables 
The two grade averages used as dependent variables are increasing with the number 
of students in the municipality. This implies that students in larger municipalities and 
hence, in larger schools perform better than students in for example the countryside. 
Both grades are also increasing with the number of teachers per 100 students which is 
not surprising. The effects are however quite small, especially from the number of 
students. 
 
4.4  Peer Group Effects 
Even though the results seem to be reasonably non sensitive to the three different 
specifications, a further sensitivity check might be called for since peer group effects 
previously have been found to be of importance when explaining educational 
achievement. Therefore three models that include peer variables are estimated. The 
results of these regressions are given in Appendix, Table 3. In order to analyse peer 
group effects, the sample is changed dramatically with the number of observations 
decreasing from 50 000 to about 7 000. This is due to the fact that it is not possible to 
identify individual classes in the two year educations and in the individual programs. 
The estimations only include three year educational programs and only students at 
fairly small schools since it is not possible to see which students that belong to which 
class at the larger schools. The population is hence somewhat different form the 
previous one in the sense of being more homogenous. The first two models 
investigate the effects on upper secondary school only; while model three investigate 
total effects. In Table 3 there is also a fourth model included.  In that model the same 
type of regression as in the third model in Table 2 is done, but with the same sample 
as in the GPA models. 
 
At first glance, it looks at though when peer groups are taken into account, the 
coefficients change drastically. Turning to the fourth model though, this seems not to 
be due to the peer group variables being included but to the homogeneity of the 
sample.  
 
For upper secondary school, I loose the significance of being first or second 
generation immigrant, of divorce, and the age of the parents no longer seem to matter. 
  17Being born abroad, however, still has a negative impact on GPA. Parental education 
and income are both still significant and positive. When looking at the overall effects 
though, the coefficients are very much like the ones in table 2. The exception is the 
coefficients for parental age which are not significant. 
 
An interesting thing is that for the upper secondary school grades, when compulsory 
school grades are controlled for, boys are performing better. In the third model, the 
effect is the same as in the Table 2 regressions, meaning that the overall effect of 
being male is still negative for the grades. 
  
The hours of work by the parents doesn’t seem to matter when looking at upper 
secondary school grades only for this reduced sample. But if the mother works less 
than full time it again has positive overall effects on the child’s grade. Interestingly 
enough, in this sample, it has positive overall effects if the father works less than full 
time, but more than halftime. This implies the existence of a working father hypotesis.  
 
When looking at the upper secondary school grades only, in the first and second 
models, the effect of the average grade variable is negative, meaning that, given your 
compulsory school grades, attending a class with better students is negative (see 
section 3.1). The exception is if you are studying the three year natural science 
program, then it is positive if your peers are performing well. Looking at overall 
effects, in the third model, the average grade coefficient is instead positive, this is in 
line with earlier research.   
 
The coefficient for the number of students is no longer significant in any of the 
models, which is not surprising since all students included in this sample attend small 
schools and schools tend to be smaller in smaller municipalities. The teacher density 
has an effect on the upper secondary school grades, but the number of upper 
secondary school teachers has no overall effect. To sum up, the inclusion of the peer 
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   Model  
Variable GPA  9
th grade  GPA total  GPA upp. sec. 
Constant 2,88***  114,56***  -3,77*** 
GPA 9
th grade  
    -  -  33,51*** 
Male  -0,25*** -8,84*** -1,13*** 
Sec. gen.  immigrant  4,0E-03  -2,28***  -1,23*** 
First gen. immigrant  -0,12***  -9,06***  -3,48*** 
Child born abroad  -0,34***  -12,81***  -5,85*** 
TT -  -0,24  5,65*** 
TP -  -8,90***  10,16*** 
IP -  -38,67***  -5,71*** 
N -  14,40***  -4,4E-02 
TS -  5,92***  -3,51*** 
SBA -  -1,41***  -0,17 
SL -  8,33***  4,85*** 
SMC -  -4,26***  2,87*** 
Divorce -9,3E-02***  -2,88***  -1,18*** 
Mother age  6,1E-03***  0,15***  0,11*** 
Father age  1,3E-03*  0,14***  0,11*** 
Mother  higher  education  0,24*** 5,17*** 2,11*** 
Father higher education  0,21***  4,45***  2,84*** 
Mother 0 hours  -1,3E-03  -0,55  -0,38 
Mother 1-19 hours  3,9E-02***  2,72***  1,46*** 
Mother 20-34 hours  6,3E-02***  2,28***  0,86*** 
Father 0 hours  -2,3E-02  -1,79**  -1,47** 
Father 1-19 hours  -2,4E-02  -0,64  0,12 
Father 20-34 hours  -1,3E-02  0,78  0,52 
Mother total income  4,8E-04***  1,1E-02***  6,4E-03*** 
Father total income  1,7E-04***  2,8E-03***  3,6E-03*** 
Number of students  1,2E-06***  1,4E-04***  4,8E-05** 
Teacher density  9,4E-03** 0,20**  0,37*** 
R
2  adjusted  0,16 0,21 0,54 
Number of observations  48 889  49 033  48 880 
* Statistically Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Statistically Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Statistically Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
  195 Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the effects of parental hours of work on children’s educational 
achievement measured both as GPA from ninth year of compulsory school and as 
GPA from the last year of upper secondary school while controlling for a wide range 
of socioeconomic variables. The empirical part is based upon data about almost all of 
the students graduating from upper secondary school in 1997 (about 50  000 
individuals). The main findings are that, in line with the working mother hypothesis 
and with previous research, there is a positive effect of the mother’s income 
(contingent on hours of work) on the child’s performance in school. A higher income 
by fathers is also associated with higher GPA among children. The hours of labour 
market work by mothers’ influences the educational achievements of the children. If 
the mother works less then full time, preferably even less then halftime, it has positive 
effects on the child’s grades. The effects are not only found in compulsory school, but 
are also appearing when upper secondary school is singled out. This is also in line 
with the working mother hypothesis and in line with previous studies by for example 
Stafford (1986). There are no significant effects of the father’s hours of work, as long 
as he works a positive amount of time. The reason for this result may, however, be 
that there is to little variation in the hours of work performed by fathers, and should 
thereby be interpreted with caution. 
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Table 3. Estimation results with peers  
 
 Model 








Constant -5,49  -15,23**  71,02***  -35,63*** 
GPA 9
th grade  
    41,97***  41,87***  -  41,56*** 
Male 0,88*  0,86**  -7,84***  0,91* 
Sec. gen.  immigrant  -0,61  -0,60  -16,46***  -0,62 
First gen. immigrant  -1,52  -1,45  -3,23***  -1,50 
Child born abroad  -6,54***  -6,53***  -6,77***  -6,54*** 
N -57,40***  -1,93**  9,37***  -4,22*** 
TS  -13,33  -4,41*** 4,51*** -5,51*** 
SBA -12,38  0,75  0,70  1,09 
SL -26,59  4,62***  6,57***  3,92*** 
SMC 16,60  3,33**  -2,29  5,04*** 
Average grade  -8,74**  -5,79***  11,75***  - 
Average grade * N   14,15** -  -  - 
Average grade * TS  2,51 - - - 
Average grade * SBA   3,68 - - - 
Average grade * SL  8,50 - - - 
Average grade * S MC  -4,30 -  -  - 
Divorce  -0,87  -0,95 -2,36** -0,92 
Mother age  0,12  0,11  0,16  0,11 
Father age  8,1E-02  7,8E-02  0,12  7,7E-02 
Mother higher education  1,92***  1,91***  5,26***  1,91*** 
Father higher education  2,54***  2,49***  4,43***  2,46*** 
Mother 0 hours  -0,84 -1,05  -2,51  -1,10 
Mother 1-19 hours  1,08  1,03  3,79***  1,00 
Mother 20-34 hours  0,69  0,67  2,01***  0,68 
Father 0 hours  -2,38  -2,4  -4,11  -2,30 
Father 1-19 hours  3,96  3,8  2,17  3,73 
Father 20-34 hours  1,90  2,03  3,45*  2,09 
Mother total income  8,1E-04***  8,0E-04***  1,4E-03***  7,9E-04*** 
Father total income  4,7E-04***  4,7E-04***  1,6E-04***  4,8***E-04 
Number of students  2,6E-05  2,8E-05  8,6E-05  2,7E-05 
Teachers 0,63**  0,61** 0,42 0,73** 
R
2 adjusted  0,56  0,56  0,15  0,56 
Number of observations  6 308  6 313  6 314  6 314 
* Statistically Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Statistically Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Statistically Significant at the 1 percent level 
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